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We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies in which the court
is an active player. Ex ante, the contracting parties cannot include the risky un-
foreseen contingenciesinthe contract theydraw up.Expost,the courtobserves
whether an unforeseen contingency occurred and decides whether to void or
uphold the contract. If the contract is voided by the court, the parties can rene-
gotiate a new agreement ex post. There are two effects of a court that voids con-
tracts. The parties’ incentives to undertake relationship-speciﬁc investment are
reduced, and the parties enjoy greater insurance against the unforeseen con-
tingencies that the ex ante contract cannot account for. In this context, we fully
characterize the optimal decision rule for the court. The behavior of the optimal
court is determined by the trade-off between the need for incentives and the
gains from insurance that voiding in some circumstances offers to the agents.
1. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Courts regularly intervene in contracts at the behest of one of the contracting
parties to void or otherwise modify an agreement the parties have signed. One
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  Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization Advance Access published September 13, 2006justiﬁcation for courts overriding voluntary agreements is to insure the parties
against changes in the environment between the time the agreement was made
and the time when it is to be consummated. Changes in the environment can
leadtochangesinthecostsandbeneﬁtstothepartiesinvolvedthatexposethem
to risks that they prefer to avoid.
1 The possibility of renegotiation protects the
parties from carrying out Pareto-dominated transactions but not from the ﬂuc-
tuations in utility that stem from the uncertainty in the underlying environment.
If the parties foresee all relevant contingencies and agree on the optimal
transactions given them, these can be included in the contract, thus providing
protection from these risks. Both common sense and court decisions suggest
that such foresight is unreasonable, however. Regardless of the parties’ expe-
rience and care in designing their contract, there will always be residual risk
they face due to ‘‘unforeseen contingencies.’’
There is considerable ambiguity about the meaning of unforeseen contin-
gencies; we will discuss the term brieﬂy before proceeding further. We take
the position that parties can perfectly foresee the possibility of various con-
tingencies but are unable to describe the circumstances in sufﬁcient detail
to include all relevant contingencies in their contract.
2 When the contracting
parties understand that they are unaware of all signiﬁcant potential events, the
questionarisesastohowtheycanprotectthemselvesagainsttheriskstheyface
when committing to a necessarily incomplete contract.
In this article, we take the view that although contracting parties are unable
to identify all relevant contingencies ex ante, it may be clear both to the parties
and outsiders that the circumstances at the time the contract calls upon one of
the parties to act differ materially from those envisioned at the time the con-
tract was written. In this event, a court can make such a determination and void
thecontractinordertoprovide insurancethepartiesarguably desire butcannot
effect on their own. A primary goal of this article is to model formally the
effects of ex ante unforeseen events that might be recognized as such ex post.
A court that voids contracts in this way may provide desirable insurance but
not without cost. A central beneﬁt of a contract is a guarantee that parties will
receive a return for investments that have speciﬁc value in their relationship.
Without a guarantee, an individual has a diminished incentive to invest be-
cause he or she may obtain only a portion of the beneﬁts stemming from in-
vestment under an ex post (re)negotiated outcome. Courts that void contracts
to provide insurance do so at the cost of reducing the ability to provide incen-
tives for an efﬁcient level of ex ante investment.
We develop and analyze a model of a buyer and a seller who contract in an
environment that includes an active court whose role is to determine which
1. See Kaplow and Shavell (2002, sec. 4) for a general discussion of incomplete contracts and
enforcement.
2. Al-Najjar et al. (2006) provide a formal model that ﬁts this view of what an unforeseen
contingency is. They use the term ‘‘undescribable’’ to label these contingencies. Concerning the
possible meanings of the term unforeseen contingencies that have been discussed in previous lit-
erature, see also Tirole (1999) and the survey by Dekel et al. (1998).
2 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organizationcontracts to void and which to uphold.
3 In our model, a court can coordinate
andguidecontractingpartiesbymeansofprecedentsthatshapethecontracting
parties’ expectationsabout future rulings.Weassume thatthe courtmaximizes
ex ante expected gains from contracting and characterize the optimal policy,
which is to void contracts in events that are deemed ex post to impose a high
level of uninsurable risk on the contracting parties.
In the simple setup that we analyze, the interests of all participants are
aligned. Ex ante, the objective function of the court is not in conﬂict with
the expected utility of either of the trading parties. This, in turn, implies that
the parties could attempt to replicate the behavior of the optimal court using
private means. However, this will only be true in the simpliﬁed setup that we
deal with here. For example, if there is any asymmetric information between
the contracting parties, informational externalities would arise and this con-
clusion would not necessarily hold.
4
1.2 Relation to the Literature
The seminal works on incomplete contracts by Grossman and Hart (1986) and
Hart and Moore (1990) took as given the existence of contingencies that may
occur after the signing of a contract but cannot be described at the time the
parties contract. The inability to describe all relevant contingencies, and make
contract terms a function of them, affects agents’ incentives. When contracts
are incomplete, the contracting parties may ﬁnd it optimal to renegotiate the
terms of trade in the event that certain contingencies arise. Agents whose
investments are sunk at this time will not receive the full beneﬁts of those
investments. This holdup problem leads to inefﬁcient initial investments. In
summary, incomplete contracts may make it impossible to avoid inefﬁcient
outcomes.
A number of articles have shown that the amount of inefﬁciency, however,
is not ﬁxed. Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) show that
theownershipstructureofphysicalassetscanaffectinvestmentincentivesand,
hence, efﬁciency; Bernheim and Whinston (1998) show that if it is impossible
tocontractoversomepartofarelationship,itmaybeoptimaltobelessspeciﬁc
than is possible in other parts of that relationship; Aghion and Tirole (1997)
and Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that the distribution of authority and
power in a ﬁrm can affect efﬁciency when complete contracts are impossible.
Boththe original work,illustrating howincompletecontractscanprecipitate
inefﬁciency, and the subsequent work, demonstrating how institutional design
can ameliorate that inefﬁciency, essentially ignore the role of a court in
3. Throughout the rest of the article,we use the terms upholdand enforce (a contract) in a com-
pletely interchangeable way. Our court does not engage in ‘‘gap ﬁlling’’ in that it only rules on
whether a contract should be voided or not, rather than attempting to impose new terms on the
parties.Thisseemstobethepredominantviewofhowactualcourtsbehaveandofhowtheyshould
in fact behave (Kull 1991).
4. In Anderlini et al. (2005), we analyze a model where there is an informational externality
between different types of contracting parties.
Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies 3adjudicating and enforcing contracts that are written.
5 The inefﬁciencies an-
alyzed in the articles discussed above might be diminished by a court that can
ameliorate them through various forms of intervention.
6 Stated more strongly,
the work on incomplete contracts is ‘‘partial equilibrium,’’ analyzing a subset
of agents’ behavior taking as ﬁxed the behavior of agents outside the model
(the courts), without investigating whether the assumed ﬁxed behavior of the
outside agents is in fact optimal. Maskin and Tirole (1999) make this point
most forcefully by showing that in a standard incomplete contracting model,
the existence of undescribable (unforeseen) contingencies does not affect the
set of payoff outcomes that can be achieved through contracting, if one allows
a court with large discretionary authority. This is shown by exhibiting a mech-
anism capable of generating as equilibrium any payoffs that could be achieved
with complete contracts. This mechanism does not mean that contract incom-
pleteness isirrelevant, however. Maskinand Tirole (1999) expand the scope of
interaction between the contracting parties and the court to include arbitrary
systems of communication and clearly go beyond anything seen in practice.
Our article incorporates an active court, the scope of which is limited, in
contrast to both the traditional literature and Maskin and Tirole (1999). We
provide a detailed speciﬁcation of undescribable contingencies, including
the information available to a court at the time performance is called for. The
contracts that parties write differ from those they would write if courts did
nothing more than passively enforce the contracts that are written. Despite the
inclusion of a more active court, the basic message of the incomplete contract-
ing literature remains: contracts will still be incomplete and the incomplete-
ness causes inefﬁciency.
There is a relatively large literature on the effect of the rules courts use on
the actions of those governed by the rules. For example, there is a substantial
body of analysis comparing the incentive effects of strict liability with the in-
centive effects of a negligence rule in tort theory and comparisons of different
remedies for breach in contract theory.
7 Our analysis differs from this work in
two ways. First, these literatures focus largely on particular rules that are used
in practice and compare the incentive effects of these rules in different envi-
ronments. In contrast, we consider a richer set of rules, with courts optimizing
across that set; our framework admits more easily the formulation of alterna-
tive rules to those already in existence. The second difference is that earlier
work is typically concerned with comparisons between qualitatively different
rules, whereas our court must make quantitative decisions, such as the thresh-
old for which unforeseen contingencies will change the court’s decision of
whether or not to void the contract.
8
5. A ‘‘minimal’’ court is assumed to exist to force the parties to perform according to the con-
tract as originally written.
6. SeeEgglestonetal.(2000)foradiscussionontheroleofcourtsininterpretingandenforcing
contracts.
7. See Kaplow and Shavell (2002) for a discussion of these literatures.
8. See Kaplow (2000) and Kaplow and Shavell (2002).
4 The Journal of Law, Economics, & OrganizationA major beneﬁt of formally incorporating the court is that it allows a richer
analysis of contracting. In addition, it provides the structure for a serious ex-
amination of what precisely a court might do. In this article, we restrict atten-
tion to particularly simple rules a court can follow, namely, to determine the
circumstances under which a contract will be voided.
1.3 Court Practices
We discussed in Section 1.2 the relation of our work to previous literature.
Before proceeding to our formal model, it is useful to also discuss the relation
between our work and actual court practices to illustrate that courts insure con-
tracting parties along the lines that we argue are optimal. They will discharge
a party’s obligation to perform under a contract based on the emergence of
risks that were not foreseen at the time the contract was entered into under
some conditions. There are several categories of intervening events that might
be the basis for excusing performance, two of which are similar to the unfore-
seen contingencies that are the focus of this article. The ﬁrst is impracticability
of performance; this occurs when unanticipated events subsequent to contract-
ingmakethepromisedperformanceextremelyburdensomeeconomically.The
second category is termed frustration of purpose. One view of the frustration
doctrine is that it will ‘‘...excuse performance where performance remains
possible, but the value of the performance to at least one of the parties and
the basic reason recognized by both parties for entering into the contract have
been destroyed by a supervening and unforeseen event.’’
9
The court intervention proposed in this article that voids contracts under
some circumstances can be considered to be of either of these two types. Per-
formance is clearly not impossible since ultimately the contracted transaction
is consummated; the voiding of the contract serves only to relieve one or the
other of the parties from an abnormally negative consequence resulting from
supervening events. Frustration of purpose has been applied in a manner very
similar to that proposed in this article. Small risks will not be the cause for
voiding the contract, but sufﬁciently large risks will be.
It is, of course, the very essence of contract that it is directed at the elim-
inationofsomerisksforeach partyinexchangefor others. Eachreceives
the certainty of price, quantity, and time, and assumes the risk of chang-
ing market prices, superior opportunity, or added costs. It is implicit in
the doctrine of impossibility (and the companion rule of frustration of
purpose) that certain risks are so unusual and have such severe con-
sequences that they must have been beyond the scope of the assignment
of risks inherent in the contract, that is, beyond the agreement made by
the parties. To require performance in that case would be to grant the
9. Spalding & Son, Incorporated v. The United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 242; 1993 Claims Lexis 39.
See also Everett Plywood Corporation v. The United States, 227 Ct. Cl. 415; 651 F.2d 723; 1981
U.S. Ct. Cl. Lexis 278; 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1234; 11 ELR 21026; 28 Cont. Cas. Fed.
(CCH) P81,397.
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in making the contract. ...The question is, given the commercial cir-
cumstances in which the parties dealt: Was the contingency which de-
veloped one which the parties could reasonably be thought to have
foreseen as a real possibility which could affect performance? Was it
one of that variety of risks which the parties were tacitly assigning to
the promisor by their failure to provide for it explicitly? If it was, per-
formance will be required. If it could not be so considered, performance
is excused.
10
This case is not an isolated instance. Willinston (1938) on Contracts, a stan-
dard reference to the interpretation of contracts, has this to say:
The important question is whether an unanticipated circumstance has
made performance of the promise vitally different from what should rea-
sonably have been within the contemplation of both parties when they
entered into the contract. If so, the risk should not fairly be thrown upon
the promisor.
We focus on the case in which the events that alter the costs and beneﬁts to
the parties of performance as speciﬁed in the contract were unforeseeable, but
courts have typically taken a less stringent attitude of the circumstances in
which supervening events could warrant excusing performance. Speciﬁcally,
it is not necessary that a supervening event be literally unforeseeable but,
rather, that it was in fact unforeseen; this is illustrated by the following
two cases.
The question we answer here is not whether the destruction of the for-
est’s regenerative capacity should have been considered at the time of
contracting but,rather,whetheritwasconsidered.Thereisnothinginthe
contract nor in the parties’ dealings to suggest that the parties ever pre-
sumed more than a continuance of the conditions necessary to give pur-
pose to a selective cut contract. In short, the contract did not address the
conditions that arose; hence, further performance under the contract is
excused.
11
...it would be untenable to conclude that the parties intended that the
[plaintiffs] should assume the risk of an adverse tax ruling simply
because such a ruling was, in a sense, foreseeable and because the
10. Mishara Construction Company, Inc. v. Transit-Mixed Concrete Corp. (no number in orig-
inal)SupremeJudicialCourtofMassachusetts365Mass.122;310N.E.2d363;1974Mass.LEXIS
635; 70 A.L.R.3d 1259; 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 556.
11. See footnote 9. Spalding had a contract to harvest timber on U.S. government land that the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) cancelled after a ﬁre on the adjacent property required un-
foreseen remedial action. The court upheld BLM’s right to cancel.
6 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organizationcontract did not expressly excuse performance in the event of its
occurrence.
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The main point of this article is to demonstrate how a court can increase
welfare by excusing performance in some situations where unforeseen events
have dramatically changed the consequences of performance for one of the
parties to a contract. We point out that the role for courts that we advocate
ﬁts within the U.C.C.: ‘‘Delay in delivery or non-delivery in whole or in part
byaseller...isnotabreachofhisdutyunderacontractforsaleifperformance
as agreed has been made impracticable by the occurrence of a contingency
the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the contract
was made ...’’ U.C.C. 2-615(a). Comment 4 to this provision provides more
substance:
Increased cost alone does not excuse performance unless the rise in cost
is due to some unforeseen contingency which alters the essential nature
of the performance. Neither is a rise or a collapse in the market in itself
a justiﬁcation, for that is exactly the type of business risk which business
contracts made at ﬁxed prices are intended to cover. But a severe short-
age of raw materials or of supplies due to a contingency such as war,
embargo, local crop failure, unforeseen shutdown of major sources of
supply, which either causes a marked increase in cost or altogether pre-
vents seller from securing supply necessary for his performance, is
within contemplation of this section.
The optimal court that we derive subsequently is entirely consistent with
this. The code allows for excuse when there is a ‘‘marked’’ increase in the cost
to the seller. Our model will call for excuse when there is an unforeseen con-
tingency that results in a signiﬁcant difference between the actual and the
expected cost. The value of the insurance that results from excusing perfor-
mance outweighs the diminished incentives to invest that accompany voiding
the contract. In sum, contract law is amenable to the rule that we will derive.
13
1.4 Outline
The plan of the rest of the article is as follows: In Section 2 we describe the
model in full detail, and we comment on the assumptions we make. We
12. WestLosAngelesInstituteforCancerResearch,Appellant,v.WardMayeretal.,Appellees,
No. 19551; U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; 366 F.2d 220; 1966 U.S. App. LEXIS
5088. In August 1951,Ward Mayer and his wife and son contracted to sell the business to the West
LosAngelesInstituteforCancerResearch,atax-exemptentity.Thetransactionwaspatternedafter
thesaleandleasebackagreementspreviouslyapprovedbytheInternalRevenueService(IRS).The
IRS rejected the tax premises upon which the transaction was based, and the Mayers sued to re-
cover the property. The district court granted the relief sought on the ground that the sale and
leaseback arrangement was frustrated by the revenue ruling.
13. We are grateful to a referee for pointing this out.
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will choose for the general court’s decision rules, whereas in Section 4 we
present the main result of the article: the characterization of the optimal de-
cision rule for the court. In Section 5 we discuss several leading cases deal-
ing with frustration and impracticability in the context of our optimal court.
Section 6 concludes the article. For ease of exposition, we have relegated all
proofs to the Appendix.
2. The Model
As mentioned in Section 1, we are interested in courts that have a role in trad-
ingoff parties’incentive toinvestwith their desire for insurance inthe event of
unforeseen contingencies. To investigate this trade-off, we consider a simple
buyer and seller model.
For insurance to have any beneﬁt, at least one of the parties must be risk
averse; we assume a risk-neutral buyer and risk-averse seller. The buyer and
seller trade a widget; the risk they face is that the cost and beneﬁt of the widget
areuncertainatthe time theycontract.Theuncertaintyabout costsandbeneﬁts
captures the idea that there is a ‘‘normal’’ cost and beneﬁt, cN and vN, but that
both parties are aware that there is a possibility that an unforeseen contingency
could give rise to high levels of costs and beneﬁts: cH and vH. For simplicity,
we assume that the gains from trade are constant, that is,
D ¼ vH   cH ¼ vN   cN:
Hence, it is efﬁcient to trade whether the costs and beneﬁts are normal or high.
This assumption is made for tractability. Our results would not qualitatively
change if the costs and beneﬁts were not perfectly correlated or if the mag-
nitude of the gains from trade was variable. We assume that cH   cN:
Before going on, we will illustrate the components of the model with ref-
erence to Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States (1966),
14 a case in-
volving commercial impracticability. In this case, the defendant chartered
a ship operated by Transatlantic to carry a cargo of wheat from the United
States to Iran. Six days after the ship left port, the Suez canal was closed
by the Egyptian government, forcing the ship to reroute around the Cape of
Good Hope. Transatlantic sued for additional compensation for its increased
expenses. Put into our model, the United States is the risk-neutral buyer and
Transatlantic the risk-averse seller. The normal cost is the cost of transporting
the wheat via the Suez canal, whereas the high cost is the cost of transporting
via the longer route.
We assume that the buyer has all the bargaining power ex ante when a con-
tractisproposed.Inotherwords,theequilibriumcontractistheresultofatake-
it-or-leave-it offer from the buyer to the seller. Ex post, in some instances,
renegotiation will take place. We assume that the seller has all the bargaining
power in the ex post renegotiation: if renegotiation occurs, the seller makes
14. Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States, 363 F.2d 312, 315 (CADC 1966).
8 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organizationa take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer. The assumption that both ex ante and
ex post, one or the other of the parties has all the bargaining power is for ex-
positional ease; none of our results depends qualitatively on bargaining power
being absolute for one or the other. Our results would not hold, however, if the
buyer has all the bargaining power ex post.
A central issue in this article is how unforeseen contingencies are modeled,
and we will discuss verbally our approach before describing the formal mod-
eling. We assume that ex post, the court, as well as the parties, can recognize
some events that are out of the ordinary. For example, all parties recognize and
agree that the events of 9/11 were, in some sense, unforeseen. However, it is
likely that for every possible unfolding of events, one could claim that there is
some unforeseen component, so excusing performance whenever there has
been an unforeseen event cannot be a useful rule. We assume that the court
can ‘‘categorize’’ events ex post in the following sense. For any given realized
event, the court will understand that if performance were excused in that in-
stance, consistency (i.e., following precedent) would lead it to excuse perfor-
mance in similar circumstances in the future. Assuming that the court can
categorize events ex post essentially means that the court understands the con-
sequences of excusing performance in the present contractual arrangement on
future contracting parties, if the court wishes to be consistent.
In addition to the court’s categorizing events, we assume that the court, im-
plicitly or explicitly, assigns a probability to the category of events that are
similar to the events at hand. That is, the court understands that if it desires
to be consistent, excusing performance in the present contract will result in
excusing performance in future contracts with the probability the court assigns
to the category of events similar to the case before it. The basic notion, then, is
thatcourts makedecisionsatthe expoststagebutunderstandthat,basedonthe
court’s decision, future contracting parties will make inferences about the
probability that performance will be excused.
In our model, the presumption would be that the closing of the Suez canal
was unforeseen by both Transatlantic and the United States and recognized as
so by the courts after the fact. Our assumption is that if courts are consistent,
however they will treat the suit between Transatlantic and the United States,
they will treat ‘‘similar’’ future cases in the same way. This leaves open what
cases would be similar—future cases in which the Suez is again closed? Future
cases in which some canal is closed? Future cases in which some unforeseen
event results in increased transportation costs? In effect, our assumption that
thecourtcancategorizetheevent‘‘SuezclosedbyEgyptiangovernment’’isan
assumption that the court can assign a probability that the decision in the case
at hand will affect future cases. Although we do notinclude it inour model,the
written opinion accompanying the court’s decision will determine to a large
extent what future cases would be deemed similar in practice.
We formalize these ideas next. With probability (1   q), we assume that the
world is in a ‘‘normal’’ state. In this case, the cost of the widget to the seller is
cN, whereas the value of the widget to the buyer is vN ¼ cN þ D: With the
complementary probability q, the world is in a state that will be deemed to
Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies 9be ‘‘exceptional,’’ meaning that, ex post, it will be deemed to have been un-
foreseen.Inthecaseofanunforeseenstate,thecostofawidgettothesellerand
the beneﬁt of the widget to the buyer are uncertain.
Our aim is to model a court that trades off the diminished incentive effects
resulting from voiding contracts with the insurance gains such voiding gener-
ates. Categorization of an unforeseen event and assigning that category a prob-
ability allow the court to measure the incentive costs of excusing performance.
What remains is a speciﬁcation of the information the court would need to
gauge the insurance beneﬁts of voiding. There cannot be a role for a court that
excuses performance if the court can precisely observe the payoffs to the
parties; in such a world, the parties could simply specify a contract price for
anychangeinpayoffsresultingfromunforeseencontingencies,therebyprovid-
ing full insurance within the contract itself. Thus, a necessary condition for
a court to have a role that includes excusing performance in some unforeseen
events,butnotinall,isthatthecourtmusthavesomeideaofthemagnitudeofthe
effect of the unforeseen contingency on payoffs but not observe precisely (and
hence condition on) these payoffs. For example, the increased costs to Trans-
atlanticduetotheSuezclosureincludetheopportunitycostofthevesselforthe
increased time, which the court might be unable to determine with more pre-
cision than that they were very large. We model the court’s information in the
simplest way to capture this: we will assume that, although the court does not
observe whether the state of the world is normal or exceptional, the court can
assess the magnitude of the impact that this unforeseen contingency has on the
parties’ payoffs. Speciﬁcally, in an exceptional state, the cost of the widget to
the seller iscH(h) (and hence,from the assumptionthat the gains fromtrade are
constant, the buyer’s valuation is vHðhÞ¼cHðhÞþD), where h parameterizes
the magnitude of the effect that an unforeseen state has on the cost and beneﬁt.
We further assume that h is independent of whether the world is in a normal
state or in an exceptional one, and it is uniformly distributed in the interval
[0, 1]. The court does observe the realization of h but does not observe whether
the worldis in a normal state orin an exceptional one. The value of hreveals to
the court the magnitude of the impact of unforeseen contingencies.
If we denote by g(h) the difference between cH and cN for a given h, we have
that
cHðhÞ¼cN þ gðhÞ: ð1Þ
We also take g to be differentiable and to satisfy g(h) ¼ 0 for every h 2 [1/2, 1]
andlimh/0gðhÞ¼N:Thus,forh2[1/2,1],there isnoriskassociatedwith the
cost. This risk is present for h 2 [0, 1/2] and increases without bound as h
approaches zero.
To summarize, the parties face a risk at the time they contract that as a con-
sequence of an unforeseen contingency, the cost and value of the widget will
be abnormally high at the time production and delivery are to take place.
Ex post, unforeseen contingencies will only be recognized by the contracting
parties. The court will know the variance of costs associated with the unfore-
seen contingency but not the actual payoffs to the parties. We assume that the
10 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organizationparties cannot contract on h, the effect that an unforeseen contingency has on
the parties’ payoffs. They can only rely on the court to be protected against the
uncertainty associated with unforeseen contingencies (if this is what the court
ﬁnds optimal to do).
This risk can be avoided by not contracting ex ante and simply contracting
after the state is realized. So that there is a beneﬁt to contracting ex ante, we
assume that the buyer can undertake an ex ante, noncontractible, investment
e 2 [0, 1] at a cost w(e), where we assume that w is twice differentiable, con-
vex, and satisﬁes w#(0) ¼ 0 and lime/1 w#ðeÞ¼þ N: A buyer’s investment of
e increases the value to him or her of the widget of an amount eR. Conse-
quently, if the buyer chooses the level of relationship-speciﬁc investment e,
his or her value of the widget is eR þ D þ ci, where i 2f N, Hg.
Since the buyer is risk neutral, he or she maximizes expected proﬁt, minus
the convex cost of investment as above. The risk-averse seller maximizes the
expected value of a strictly increasing twice differentiable V : R/R: To em-
body risk aversion, we also take V to be strictly concave so that V# > 0 and
V$ < 0.
Thetimingofthemodelcanbespeciﬁedasfollows: Thepartiesformbeliefs
about the court’s rule for enforcing or excusing performance, based on the
court’s past record (i.e., based on the precedents). Negotiation then takes place
between the contracting parties. Recall that the buyer has all the bargaining
power at this stage; hence, negotiation is a simple take-it-or-leave-it offer
of a contract from the buyer to the seller. A contract may specify an ex ante
transfer; if it does, the transfer is made immediately after a contract is agreed
on.
15Afterthenegotiationofanexantecontract,thebuyerchoosesthe levelof
speciﬁc investment e that increases the value of the widget to him or her by eR.
The state of the world—whether the parties trade in a normal or in an ex-
ceptional state—isthen realized andisobservedbybothpartiestothecontract.
Moreover, we also assume that the parties to a contract observe the exact value
of the cost ci, i 2f N, Hg. Should the court become involved, as we discussed
above, it does not observe whether the parties operate in a normal or in an
exceptionalstatebutdoesknowthemagnitudeoftheimpactthatanunforeseen
contingency might have on the parties’ welfare. In other words, the court
observes the realization of h. Either party can bring the other side to court,
and if this occurs, the court is assumed to mandate or excuse performance
consistent with past rulings.
In the case in which the court decides to void the existing contract, rene-
gotiation takes place between the buyer and the seller. Renegotiation is mod-
eled as a take-it-or-leave-it offer from the seller to the buyer of a price at which
15. Notice that if the transferwere ‘‘refundable’’ if the contractis voided, then we couldsimply
incorporate it in the trade price that the contract speciﬁes. Hence, a nonrefundable ex ante transfer
like the one we consider allows for a richer set of possible contracts. With respect to the actual
behavior of courts, it is argued that when courts determine that contracts should not be enforced as
written, ‘‘...parties will be permitted to walk away from their bargain, without damages for re-
liance or restitution for beneﬁts conferred’’ (Kull 1991).
Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies 11to trade. When renegotiation occurs, following the court’s decision to void the
contract, the parties’ outside options are represented by the payoffs associated
with no trade. These payoffs are normalized to zero.
Finally, trade occurs according to the terms of the original contract, if the
court decides to enforce it, or according to the terms of the renegotiated agree-
ment, if the court decides to void the original ex ante contract.
3. The Optimal Ex Ante Contract
Given our assumptions above, the parties to a contract can only specify in an
ex ante contract a constant price at which to trade, p, and an ex ante transfer
fromthebuyertotheseller,t.Ifthepartiesdecidetodrawupsuchanexantecon-
tract,itisthenlefttothecourttodeterminewhetherornottoprotectthemagainst
the possibly very large risk associated with the unforeseen contingencies.
We identify the optimal court’s ruling solving the model backward from the
last stage. We begin with the renegotiation that follows the court’s decision to
void the contract. Denote as ˆ e the given level of investment chosen by the
buyer. Since the seller has all the bargaining power at the renegotiation stage,
he will receive all the gains from trade available to the parties; these of course
total ˆ eR þ D:
Consider now the court’s decision if one of the two parties brings the other
to court. Without loss of generality, we can specify the court’s decision rule to
be a set E4[0,1]. The court enforces all contracts when h 2Eand voids all
contracts otherwise.
16 In other words, when the impact of the unforeseen con-
tingency on the parties’ welfare is too high, the court provides the parties
with insurance by voiding the existing contract.
The court determines E prior to the parties’ negotiation of the ex ante con-
tract. In other words, the parties infer the court’s decision rule from precedents
when they decide which ex ante contract to draw up.
Beforeweanalyzetheparties’negotiationoftheexantecontract,weneedto
specifytheseller’sandbuyer’soutsideoptionsiftheexantenegotiationbreaks
down. Notice thateven inthe absence ofanex antecontractthe partiescan still
trade the widget ex post. Recall that in any ex post negotiation the seller has all
the bargaining power. Hence, in any ex post agreement, he or she appropriates
all the gains from trade and receives utility Vð  eR þ DÞ; where   e is the level of
speciﬁc investment chosen by the buyer in the absence of any ex ante contract.
The buyer receives a zero share of the gains from trade.
Notice that the advantage for the parties to trade ex post is that they do not
face any uncertainty, and therefore, the seller is provided with full insurance.
However, since the returns to the buyer from his ex ante investment are zero,
he will choose an investment level such that w#ð  eÞ¼0: In other words, when
trade takes place ex post, because there is no ex ante contract, the buyer has
no incentive to invest:   e ¼ 0: We can then conclude that in the absence of an
16. Ofcourse,E isassumedtobeaLebesgue-measurableset.AswewillseeinLemma2,itwill
never be optimal for the court to void a contract if it observes h 2 [1/2, 1]. However, the general
speciﬁcation of the court’s decision rule must allow for this possibility.
12 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organizationex ante contractthe buyer’spayoffiszero whereas the seller’slevel of utilityis
V(D). The seller is fully insured, but no relationship-speciﬁc investment is un-
dertaken by the buyer. The buyer’s outside option when the ex ante contract is
negotiated is zero, whereas the seller’s outside option is V(D).
Next, we turn to the parties’ negotiation of the ex ante contract. Recall that
ex ante the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the seller of a contract
(p, t). Given the court’s decision rule E and a level of investment ˆ e; the seller’s








Vðˆ eR þ D þ tÞdh: ð2Þ
Notice that the ﬁrst integral in equation (2) refers to the case in which the
contract is upheld by the court. The second integral in equation (2) captures
those cases in which the court voids the ex ante contract.
Taking again asgiven the court’s decision ruleE anda level of investment ˆ e;




½qðˆ eR þ D þ cHðhÞ pÞþð 1   qÞ
 ðˆ eR þ D þ cN   pÞ dh   t   wðˆ eÞ: ð3Þ
If we set hE ¼
Ð
E dh; recalling that cHðhÞ¼cN þ gðhÞ; the payoffs in equa-




½qVðp þ t   cN   gðhÞÞ þ ð1   qÞVðp þ t   cNÞ dh
þð 1   hEÞVðˆ eR þ D þ tÞð 4Þ
and
BEðp;t; ˆ eÞ¼hE½ˆ eR þ D þ cN   p þq
ð
E
gðhÞdh   t   wðˆ eÞ: ð5Þ
From equation (5), it isimmediate that given (p, t) and the court’sdecision rule
E; the buyer will select a level of relationship-speciﬁc investment ˆ e such that
w#ðˆ eÞ¼hER: ð6Þ
We can now state the buyer’s optimization problem for choosing an ex ante
contract. Given the court’s decision rule E; the buyer’s take-it-or-leave-it offer




s:t:VEðp;t; ˆ eÞ VðDÞ;
BEðp;t; ˆ eÞ 0;
w#ðˆ eÞ¼hER; ð7Þ
Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies 13where the ﬁrst two constraints guarantee that it is optimal for both the seller
and the buyer to sign an ex ante contract rather than to trade ex post. If the
feasible set of problem (7) is in fact empty, then no ex ante contract will be
signed and trade will take place ex post. However, when the court’s decision
ruleischosensoastomaximizetheparties’welfare,anexantecontractwillbe
signed. We state the following without formal proof.
Remark 1. For some speciﬁcations of the court’s decision rule, the feasible
set of problem (7) is clearly not empty, and the maximized value of the ob-
jective function is strictly positive.
For example, suppose that the court never voids the contract if h 2 [1/2, 1]
and always voids the contract if h 2 [0, 1/2) so that E¼[1/2,1]. In this case,
the agents do not face any uninsurable risk from unforeseen contingencies
and can take advantage of a ﬁxed price for the case h 2Eso that the buyer will
undertake a positive amount of relationship-speciﬁc investment ˆ e such that
w#ðˆ eÞ¼R=2: It is clear that in this case there is an ex ante contract that is pre-
ferred to no contract by both the buyer and seller.
17
Notice that if the court’s decision rule is such that hE ¼ 0 we obtain a trivial
specialcase,inwhichthecourtalwaysvoidsthecontract,theexpectedproﬁtof
the buyer is zero, and the expected utility of the seller is V(D), whatever the
contract (p, t). In this case, since both parties are indifferent, we assume that
they prefer to implement the same outcome by having no contract at all.
Our characterization of the optimal contract given the court’s decision rule
can now be summarized as follows:
Proposition 1. Let a decision rule E for the court be given and assume that it
is such that it is optimal for the parties to draw up an ex ante contract. Let the
optimal ex ante contract given E—the solution to problem (7)—be denoted by
ðpE *;tE *Þ; with ˆ eE the associated level of investment. Then pE *; tE *; and ˆ eE satisfy
ð
E
½qV#ðpE * þ tE *   cHðhÞ Þþð 1   qÞV#ðpE * þ tE *   cNÞ dh
¼ hEV#ðˆ eER þ D þ tE *Þð 8Þ
and hence
pE *   cN   ˆ eER þ D: ð9Þ
Moreover, the transfer tE * is such that
VEðpE *;tE *; ˆ eEÞ¼VðDÞ: ð10Þ
Equality (10) of Proposition 1 is a simple consequence of the fact that the
seller’s expected utility is increasing in t, whereas the buyer’s expected proﬁt
is a decreasing function of t.
17. When an ex ante contract is preferred to trading ex post, it is immediate by standard argu-
ments that the solution to problem (7) is in fact unique.
14 The Journal of Law, Economics, & OrganizationThe intuition behind equations (8) and (9) of Proposition 1 is not hard to
explain. In those states in which the contract is renegotiated, the seller nec-
essarily gets a payoff (on top of the transfer t)o fˆ eER þ D: The price pE * is
chosen so as to provide the seller with the optimal partial insurance against
theﬂuctuationsofcostbetweencNandcH(h)thatoccurwhenthecourtupholds
the contract. This means equating the seller’s expected marginal utility in this
eventuality with the seller’s marginal utility that he or she achieves when the
contract is voided by the court. Since the seller’s marginal utility is decreasing,
this implies that the price pE * minus the lowest cost cN must be above ˆ eER þ D:
4. The Court’s Optimal Decision Rule
We are now equipped with the characterization (Proposition 1) of the optimal
contract ðpE *;tE *Þ given an arbitrary decision rule E for the court. This is enough
to proceed to characterize the court’s optimal decision rule.
Recall that our court is a ‘‘Stackelberg leader.’’ Through precedents, its de-
cision rule is effectively announced to the parties. Taking into account the
effect of its choice of rule on the parties’ behavior, the court then acts so
as to maximize their welfare. From Proposition 1 we know that as a result
of the fact that the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer of an ex ante contract
to the seller, the seller’s expected utility will be V(D), regardless of the court’s
decision rule. Therefore, the court’s decision rule can be characterized as the
solution to the problem of maximizing the buyer’s expected proﬁt subject to
appropriate constraints.
The court’s maximization problem can be written as follows: Choose the set
E of h’s in which the contract is upheld so as to solve
maxBEðpE *;tE *; ˆ eEÞ
s:t:VEðpE *;tE *; ˆ eEÞ VðDÞ;
BEðpE *;tE *; ˆ eEÞ 0; ð11Þ
where ðpE *;tE *Þ is the optimal ex ante contract characterized in Proposition 1
and ˆ eE is the associated level of investment.
We begin with two partial characterizations of the court’s optimal decision
rule. Our ﬁrst claim asserts that provided a solution to problem (11) exists, it
willbesuchthatthecourtnevervoidstheparties’exantecontract whenh2[1/
2, 1]; it is never optimal for the court to void the contract if, given h, the parties
face no risk.
Remark 2. It is optimal for the court to enforce the contract whenever h 2
[1/2, 1]. More formally, assume that a solution to problem (11) exists. Then
any solution E* to this problem satisﬁes
½1=2;1 4E*
up to a set of h’s of Lebesgue measure zero.
The intuition behind Remark 2 is simple to outline. The court’s decision to
void the contract provides the parties with insurance against unforeseen
Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies 15contingencies. Whenever h 2 [1/2, 1], the cost to the seller is cN with prob-
ability one. It is therefore optimal for the court to enhance the buyer’s incen-
tives to undertake the relationship-speciﬁc investment by enforcing the ex ante
contract.
We now turn to a further partial characterization of the court’s optimal de-
cision rule. We are concerned with the ‘‘shape’’ of the court’s optimal decision
rule for those h’s that are in [0, 1/2]. We ﬁrst assert that this part of the court’s
optimaldecisionruleconsistsofathresholdlevelh*.Thecourtwillvoidtheex
ante contract when h < h* is observed and will uphold the ex ante contract
otherwise.
Remark 3. Assume that a solution to problem (11) exists. Then, up to a set
of h’s of Lebesgue measure zero, any solution to this problem has the form
E*¼[h*,1] with h* 2 [0, 1/2]. In other words, the court will enforce the ex
ante contract if h   h* and will void it if h < h*.
The intuition behind this second partial characterization of the optimal court
decision rule canbe describedasfollows: Thecourt istrading off the insurance
it provides to the parties when it voids the contract with the decrease in incen-
tives to invest that results from voiding. Incentives are adversely affected be-
cause when the court voids, at the margin, the buyer will not receive a full
return from his or her investment. Hence, the higher the probability that
the court voids, the lower is its incentive to invest. This negative effect on
investment depends only on the probability that the court will void the con-
tract. On the other hand, the value of the insurance to the parties from voiding
is greater when h is smaller since, by assumption, the spread between cN and
cH(h) becomes higher as h becomes smaller. Hence, whatever decrease in
incentives is accepted, the optimal thing for the court to do is to void for
the smallest values of h. In other words, whatever the overall probability that
the court voids the ex ante contract, the set ofvaluesof hfor which the contract
is in fact voided must take the threshold form described in Remark 3.
We now have allthe elements tocomplete the characterization ofthe court’s
optimal decision rule. We do so in Proposition 2. Aside from incorporating the
content of Remarks 2 and 3, Proposition 2 asserts that an optimal decision rule
for the court does in fact exist, that it is unique up to a set of h’s of Lebesgue
measurezero, andthat the threshold h*used by the court isinterior in the sense
that 0 < h* < 1/2.
Proposition 2. An optimal decision rule for the court exists, and it is unique
up to a set of h’s of Lebesgue measure zero.
The court’s unique optimal decision rule has the form E*¼[h*,1] with h* 2
(0,1/2).Inotherwords,givenh,thecourtupholdsthecontractwhentheparties
face norisk andwhenthe risk they face issufﬁciently low(h h*).It voids the
contract otherwise.
We have already outlined the intuition behind part of the characterization of
the court’s optimal decision rule presented in Proposition 2. To understand
16 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organizationwhy the threshold h* used by the court cannot be either 0 or 1/2, it is enough to
refer back to the speciﬁcation of the risk that the unforeseen contingencies
entail, described in Section 2. Recall that as h approaches 1/2, the risk faced
by the parties becomes negligible (cH(h) approaches cN). Therefore, as h
approaches 1/2, the value of the insurance that voiding provides shrinks to
zero. On the other hand, the costs of voiding the ex ante contract do not vanish.
Themarginalcost(intermsofdiminishedincentivesforthebuyertoundertake
relationship-speciﬁc investment) of increasing h* does not become zero as this
threshold gets closer to 1/2. Therefore, the optimal h* is below 1/2.
Consider now the nature of the risk associated with the unforeseen contin-
gencies for small h, approaching 0. In this case, the difference between cN and
cH(h) becomes unboundedly large. The gain in incentives from upholding the
ex ante contract is bounded above (it can never exceed R), although upholding
theexantecontractbecomesmoreandmorecostlyasthepartiesarefacedwith
an ever-increasing amount of uninsurable risk. Therefore, the optimal h* is
above zero.
5. Frustration, Impracticability, and Optimal Courts
The analysis of the optimal court involves the trade-off between the protection
afforded a risk-averse party when performance is excused in the face of un-
foreseen events and the consequent negative effect excuse has on optimal in-
vestment by the contracting parties. Many of the leading cases involving
frustration of purpose seem to have no signiﬁcant investment, hence no
trade-off. The classic frustration case is Krell v. Henry (1903).
18 The contract
was to rent for 2 days an apartment overlooking the coronation route for the
coronation ofKing EdwardVII.Thecoronation was canceled due tothe king’s
illness, which was deemed a frustrating event, and the contract to rent the
apartment was voided. It is difﬁcult to see a signiﬁcant investment by either
party, and voiding such a contract would seem simply to entail transferring the
risk associated with the cancellation of the coronation from one party to the
other. Absent any particular reason to believe one party was inherently more
riskaverse thanthe other,thereislittlereasonforvoiding(ornot)onefﬁciency
grounds. It would seem that ‘‘fairness’’ rather than a concern for the efﬁciency
of investment is at the heart of this case.
In Lloyd v. Murphy (1944),
19 the court was again faced with a frustration
case. The plaintiff leased land to the defendant for 5 years solely to sell cars
and gasoline shortly before World War II. After the United States entered the
war, the government ordered the sale of most new cars discontinued. The de-
fendant repudiated the contract and left the premises, whereupon the plaintiff
sued for unpaid rent. The court ruled that both parties knew that the war was
coming and that the possibility that car sales would be curtailed was possible;
furthermore, car sales were restricted but not completely eliminated. The fact
that car sales were only ‘‘severely restricted’’ rather than eliminated would
18. Krell v. Henry, 2 K.B. 740 (Eng. C.A. 1903).
19. Lloyd v. Murphy, 153 P. 2d 47 (Cal. 1944).
Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies 17play little role in our model. The issue is rather the risk that is faced by the
intervening event—World War II. There is an important point at which this
case deviates from our model. The costs voiding contracts in our model stem
from the decrease in investments that will be made prior to fulﬁlling contrac-
tual obligations when contacts may be voided. In Lloyd v. Murphy (1944), it is
likely that such costs were incurred by the lessee and not the lessor. Thus, the
logic of our analysis would suggest that there is little cost of excusing perfor-
mance on the part of the lessee.
20
Our analysis of an optimal court does bear on Transatlantic Financing Corp
v. United States (1966). The court ruled against Transatlantic, saying that the
injured party cannot proceed with performance, recover the contracted price,
and then recover its extra costs in addition. Whereas our analysis deals only
with a court voiding or enforcing a contract prior to performance, one expects
thatthe logiccarriesover toacase inwhich performancehasbegun priortothe
intervening event, and it is clear that it is efﬁcient to complete performance.
We emphasize, however, that allowing courts to go beyond voiding or enforc-
ing contracts by revising the terms of a contract is outside the scope of this
article.
21
In Selland Pontiac-GMC v. King (1986),
22 the plaintiff entered into a con-
tract with the defendant to supply four chasses for buses. The defendant was to
getbodiesfromathirdparty,speciﬁed inthecontract,thatwouldbeassembled
on the chasses. The third party went out of business and the defendant could
not get the bodies, following which the defendant tried to cancel the order for
the chasses. The court held for the defendant saying that the supply of the bod-
ieswasabasicassumptionofthe contract. This caseﬁtswellwithinourmodel:
the plaintiff likely incurred nontrivial costs between the time the contract is
signed and the time that the defendant cancels. If courts excuse performance in
similar cases, sellers will decrease the investments they make due to the risk




of its preferences. We will discuss each of these and how it relates to our anal-
ysis above.
There is a sense in which any restrictions (except for strictly physical ones)
on the court’s strategy set take us back into a partial equilibrium approach. If
20. If the sale of cars entailed a signiﬁcant investment on the part of the lessee, there would be
a nontrivial trade-off had it been the lessor who asked that the contract be voided.
21. American Trading & Production v. Shell International Marine, 453 F.2d 939 (2nd Cir.
1972)issimilartoTransatlantic FinancingCorp.v.UnitedStates(1966)inthatAmericanTrading
sued Shell for extra compensation that resulted from the Suez closing. It differed in that the
amounts were approximately double those in the Transatlantic Financing Corp. v. United States
(1966) case, but the court’s decision was the same, namely, to deny the extra compensation.
22. Selland Pontiac-GMC v. King, 384 N.W. 2d 490 (Minn. App. 1986)
18 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organizationthere are restrictions on the court’s strategy set, who put them there if the
model is truly a closed one? This article is but one step in the direction of
a model that is truly closed in this sense.
23
Once we take the view that some external considerations must be taken as
given, it is easy to see why our modeling choice of a ‘‘simple’’ strategy set for
the court is plausible. Courts typically face a large pool of possible disputes
and have very little prior speciﬁc knowledge about each case. It is clearly ef-
ﬁcient to develop court procedures that are ‘‘detail free’’ wherever possible in
the sense of being robust to even large variations in the parameters character-
izing the situations to which they apply. Our courts that can only void or up-
hold contracts rather than dictate new terms of trade are a simple way to
capture some of these considerations.
The restricted strategy space for the court that we have worked with in this
article can also be interpreted as a crude way to model the effects of a richer
domain for the preferences of the court. In particular, it is clear that in a dy-
namic world, courts must care about the reputation they accumulate about
their rulings. In the static analysis above, precedents are assumed to be equiv-
alent to the court announcing to the parties the rule that it will use in case of a
dispute. In a richer dynamic model, this would be substituted by the reputation
that the court has. At this point, the rationale for simple behavior becomes,
again, apparent. In practice, simple rules will have greater ‘‘penetration’’ as
the reputation of the court among the pool of (possibly simple minded) con-
tracting parties who might take their disputes before the court.
6.2 Are courts necessary?
One might ask whether courts are necessary to insure against unforeseen con-
tingencies. Should it not be possible for the parties to specify within the con-
tract the nature of the events in which performance is to be excused? It is
possible, and in fact common, for parties to specify within a contract that per-
formance is to be excused in particular circumstances, for example, a force
majeure clause. Such clauses typically excuse one or both parties from their
obligations in the event of war, natural disaster, or some other event outside
their control. An example of such a clause found on the Web is as follows:
Neitherpartyshallbeliableindamagesorhavetherighttoterminatethis
Agreement for any delay or default in performing hereunder if such de-
lay or default is caused by conditions beyond its control including, but
not limited to Acts of God, Government restrictions (including the
denial or cancellation of any export or other necessary license), wars,
23. Inadifferentcontext—thedesignofa‘‘legalsystem’’forsocietyasawhole—Mailathetal.
(2000) explore a model in which all ‘‘laws’’ are cheap talk. They ﬁnd that the role of the legal
system in this case is limited to selecting among the multiple equilibria of the game determined
by the physical description of the environment. See also the discussion in Schwartz and Watson
(2004).
Courts of Law and Unforeseen Contingencies 19insurrectionsand/oranyothercausebeyond thereasonablecontrolofthe





against a party seeking to be excused from performing on account of the snow.
Unless courts implicitly or explicitly set a threshold for excusing performance,
anypartythatwouldlikeacontractvoidedcanalwaysﬁndsomeeventthatmay
technically fall within the force majeure clause. A court then must determine
whether a contractual dispute actually does fall within a force majeure clause.
Our court increases efﬁciency by excusing performance in circumstances
that are deemed to have been unforeseen and, further, that expose at least
one of the parties to risk of substantial magnitude. The court, of course, is
acting after all uncertainty has been resolved (even though the court does
not fully know the realization). Hence, excusing performance at that date
is simply a transfer from one party to the second. The increases in efﬁciency
that stem from voiding a contract are a consequence of superior risk sharing
between future contracting parties. It follows, then, that it is not simply the
voiding or enforcement of a contract that determines the efﬁciency gains
but the expectations induced in future contracting parties due to the court’s
decision. If the court determines that performance is to be excused, there is
still substantial scope for the court to affect expectations through its written
decision. Future parties’ expectations will be quite different following nar-
rowly written decisions than following broadly written ones.
It is worth pointing out that contracting parties will often have information
ex ante that courts will not have, even ex post, including the likelihood of cer-
tain kinds of events, the risk aversion of the parties, and the importance of
ex ante investments. The optimal court decision rule will be different for dif-
ferent contracting pairs. The existence of different venues for adjudicating
disputes can allow for different levels of insurance by applying different
thresholds for excusing performance. Thus, the selection of, say, New York
or Delaware law to govern a contract may be about the level of insurance that
is optimal for a contracting pair as about expertise in commercial law.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Consider the ﬁrst-order conditions associated with




½qV#ðpE * þ tE *   cHðhÞ Þþð 1   qÞV#ðpE * þ tE *   cNÞ dh
¼ hEV#ðˆ eER þ D þ tE *Þ; ðA1Þ
24. Liblicense:LicensingDigitalInformation(http://www.library.yale.edu/;llicense/forcecls.
shtml).
20 The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organizationwhich of course proves equation (8). Since V$ < 0 and cH(h)   cN for every h,
qV#ðpE * þ tE *   cHðhÞ Þþð 1   qÞV#ðpE * þ tE *   cNÞ
  V#ðpE * þ tE *   cNÞ: ðA2Þ
Substituting equation (A2) into equation (A1) yields
V#ðˆ eER þ D þ tE *Þ V#ðpE * þ tE *   cNÞ;
which together with the fact that V$ < 0 implies equation (9).
The fact that equation (10) holds follows from the fact that the seller’s
expected utility VEðp;t; ˆ eÞ is monotonic increasing in t, whereas the buyer’s
expected surplus BEðp;t; ˆ eÞ is monotonic decreasing in t. n
Lemma A1. Let E* be any solution to problem (11), with associated p*, t*,
and ˆ e: Then up to a set of Lebesgue measure zero, E* must have the following
property.
Let ˆ h be any point in [0, 1]. Then if the quantity
ðˆ eR þ D þ cN   p*Þþqgðˆ hÞþð 1   hEÞ
R2
w$ðˆ eÞ
þk½qVðp* þ t*   cN   gðˆ hÞÞ
þð 1   qÞVðp* þ t*   cNÞ Vðˆ eR þ D þ t*Þ  ðA3Þ
is strictly less than zero, it must be that ˆ h;E*: Conversely, if the quantity in
equation (A3) is strictly greater than zero, then it must be that ˆ h 2E *:
Proof. Consider the total change, as a function of c, in the Lagrangean of
problem (7) when we subtract from E* the arbitrarily small interval ½ˆ h; ˆ h þ c :
After some manipulations, at c ¼ 0, the total marginal change in the Lagran-
gean can be seen to equal  1 times the quantity in equation (A3).
Therefore, if the quantity in equation (A3) is negative, the value of the
Lagrangean can be increased by subtracting from E* the interval ½ˆ h; ˆ h þ c ;
for c appropriately small. This contradicts the fact that E* is the solution
to problem (11). Clearly, this proves our ﬁrst claim.
The proof of our second claim involves a completely symmetric argument,
and the details are omitted. n
Lemma A2. Let any E be given, and assume it is such that E\[0,1/2] has
positive Lebesgue measure. Then the quantity in equation (A3) is strictly in-
creasing in ˆ h for all ˆ h 2½ 0; ˜ hÞ with < 0 < ˜ h < 1=2: It is strictly decreasing in
ˆ h for all ˆ h 2½˜ h;1=2Þ; and it is constant over the interval ˆ h 2½ 1=2;1 :
Proof. Differentiating equation (A3) with respect to ˆ h and using the ﬁrst-
order conditions of problem (7) yields
g#ðˆ hÞ 1  
V#ðp* þ t* þ cN   gðˆ hÞÞ
V#ðˆ eR þ D þ t*Þ
"#
: ðA4Þ
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p*   cN   gð˜ hÞ¼ˆ eR þ D and recalling that g#ðˆ hÞ is negative over [0, 1/2)
and zero otherwise. n
Lemma A3. Let E* be any solution to problem (11), with associated p*, t*,
and ˆ e: Then the value of the quantity in equation (A3) is strictly greater than
zero for every ˆ h 2½ 1=2;1 :
Proof. Assume by contradiction that this quantity is nonpositive. Then us-
ing Lemma A2, it must be that, without loss of generality, either E*¼Øo r
E*4[0,1/2]. This ﬁrst possibility is ruled out by Remark 1, so our contra-
diction hypothesis is E*4[0,1/2].
Now consider an alternative enforcement set E# with h
*
E ¼ hE# and
E#4½1=2;1 : Given E#; the solution to problem (7), p*
E#;t*
E#; ˆ eE#; is easily
seen to have the following properties. First of all, ˆ eE# ¼ ˆ e: Moreover,
p*
E# ¼ ˆ eER þ D þ cN and t*
E# ¼  ˆ eR:
Therefore, the buyer’s payoff in the solution to problem (7) given E# is
equal to
ˆ eR   wðˆ eÞ: ðA5Þ
Afterelementarymanipulations,thepayofftothebuyerinthesolutiontoprob-
lem (7) given E* can be written as




½qðp* þ t*   cN   gðhÞ Þþð 1   qÞðp* þ t*   cNÞ dh: ðA6Þ
Using equation (10) and the concavity of V, it is immediate to show that the
quantity in equation (A6) is strictly smaller than the payoff in equation (A5).
Since thiscontradicts the fact thatE*isasolutionto problem (11), it sufﬁcesto
prove our claim. n
Lemma A4. The quantity in equation (A3) becomes negative as ˆ h
approaches zero.
Proof. From equation (A3), it is sufﬁcient to show that the quantity
gðˆ hÞþkVðp* þ t*   cN   gðˆ hÞÞ ðA7Þ
diverges to  N as ˆ h approaches zero. This can easily be veriﬁed dividing
through by gðˆ hÞ; using l’Ho ˆspital’s rule, and recalling that V# is decreasing
and that, by assumption, limˆ h/0 gðˆ hÞ¼N: The details are omitted. n
Proof of Remark 2. The claim is a direct consequence of Lemmas A1
and A3. n
Proof of Remark 3. The claim is a direct consequence of Lemmas A1, A2,
and A3. n
22 The Journal of Law, Economics, & OrganizationProof of Proposition 2. The claim is a direct consequence of Lemmas A1,
A2, A3, and A4. n
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